Article 697 of the Islamic Penal Code (Tazirat), as the most important provision governing the crime of defamation, has always faced diverse and sometimes contradictory interpretations in judicial practice. Defamation, as one of the crimes against the dignity of individuals, is in direct interaction with freedom of expression and the right to sue. This article examines the various dimensions of this crime using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on the analysis of judicial practice, the advisory opinions of the General Legal Department of the Judiciary, and the opinions of the Unity of Procedure. In this regard, the material and moral pillars, the condition of "clarity in attribution", the possibility of defamation against legal entities, the limits of the relationship between defamation and insult, and the role of knowledge and malice are examined. Also, through a comparative analysis of the views and ambiguities in the interpretation of the phrase "inability to prove the authenticity of documents", the limitations of dealing with defamation in the courts have also been examined. The research findings show that the lack of a clear and consistent interpretation of Article 697 has led to conflicting decisions by judges and uncertainty in criminal protection of the right to reputation. Finally, the need to amend some key concepts and clarify the elements of defamation in law and practice has been emphasized.